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about ceves
CEVES is an independent think-and-do tank dedicated to the 
sustainable socio-economic development of Serbia and the Western 
Balkans, based on entrepreneurship, solidarity and civic initiative. At 
present, CEVES’ energy is focused on identifying and researching 
the most important determinants of sustainable socio-economic 
development in Serbia and the region, as well as offering innovative, 
responsible and evidence-based solutions and policies, not only for 
the state but also for the wider society – primarily to those directly 
affected by these issues (entrepreneurs, employees / unemployed, 
scientific institutions, etc.). CEVES is committed to the nationalization 
and achievement of sustainable development goals in Serbia, as a 
particularly suitable framework for directing societal development and 
for embodiment and quantification of European values, especially in 
areas not prescribed by the Acquis.
The brochure is created as a result of research done within the project „Preparatory Project for 
a Society-wide Dialogue Platform on SDGs for Serbia” supported by Government of Switzerland. 
The brochure was derived from the study “Serbia Sustainable Development Issues: A Baseline 
Review”. The Baseline Review was prepared by the Center of Advanced Economic Studies 
(CEVES), led by Kori Udovički with a research team composed of Nemanja Šormaz, Danijela 
Bobić, Aleksandra Urošev, Valentina Čolić, Mila Pejčić and Jelisaveta Lazarević.
This study benefited from comments by participants at several workshops and consultative 
meetings, as well as from bilateral meetings with stakeholders. We particularly thank 
Mr. Aleksandar Macura, Ms. Ljiljana Hadžibabic, Mr. Đorđe Krivokapić for their written contributions.
The production of this publication was supported by the Government of Switzerland. 
The publication does not necessarily represent the official stand-points of the Swiss Government.
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pillar i - serbia’s human development: dimensions and challenges 
• serbia’s human development lies well below its potential. 
• it is in the income dimension of the hdi components that serbia ranks lowest. 
• economic growth has recently accelerated, led by a small but competitive 
and export-oriented new economy. 
• serbia’s strongest human development aspect is its educational attainment 
(55th), measured by quantity – years of schooling. 
• the  quality of education does not fully  prepare youth for today’s labor 
market – either as employees or as entrepreneurs
• health is ranked low, especially considering the strong yugoslav legacy, 
reflecting overall institutional weaknesses. 
• poverty and inequality remain high, due to the low employment level 
and low re-distributive effect of fiscal policies. 
• vulnerable population groups are particularly affected by poverty 
and inequality of access.
• serbia faces  one of the fastest  rates of population decline in europe. 
pillar ii - prosperity on a green corner of the planet: 
assets and challenges.
• serbia’s sustainable development opportunities lie in the very strengths 
that today drive its export growth. 
• serbia can become an agri-food powerhouse and lift its rural areas out 
of poverty and isolation. 
• a strong engineering and metalworking tradition is giving rise to 
a recovery in the mid- and mid-to-high level technology industries. 
• some very highly-skilled graduates that stay in serbia are giving rise to 
a high-knowledge content service industry. 
• a multitude of green growth opportunities lay unexploited and could provide
the edge needed to lift sustainably serbia’sdevelopment to a higher level.
• eu environmental regulations regarding transparency, impact assessment, and the 
circular economy have largely been adopted, but are all too often not implemented. 
• serbia wastes energy that could be put in the service of sustainable 
development as well as contribute to mitigating climate change. 
• while serbia’s geostrategic position is an opportunity, other cross-cutting 
issues are largely challenges.
pillar iii - institutional capacity and partnership 
• the eu’s accession priorities regarding political and institutional reform 
are equivalent to goal 16 aligned to the highest global standards. 
• good institutions matter also in order to better attain all the other 
sixteen sdgs
• too often the status quo wins over proclaimed policy priorities. 
• even when the political will is not lacking, it is hard to call implementers
to account. 
• the capacity of specific institutions to deliver specific sdg targets should 
be monitored as intermediate targets. 
pillar iv - prosperous and cohesive communities
• in serbia lsg units perform a broad array of tasks, but there are few areas 
in which they truly exercise sovereign power. 
• own housing provides economic security, but communal services, especially
waste management, need improvement. 
• the central government’s competence in most development aspects has not
reduced regional differences in outcomes. 
• local communities need greater local autonomy in responding to development problems. 
• stakeholder engagement in fostering local sdgs could make an important 
contribution to local development! 
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Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms 
everywhere
Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food 
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promote sustainable agriculture
Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and 
promote well-being for all at all ages
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among countries
Goal 11: Make cities inclusive, safe, 
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Goal 12: Ensure sustainable 
consumption and production patterns
Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat 
climate change and its impacts
Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably 
use the oceans, seas and marine 
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combat desertification, halt and 
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ForeWord
Serbia needs to step more decisively on an accelerated and sustainable 
development path. For this, she needs to turn her thoughts to the future: 
to invest in it and shape it. But first, she needs to decide–what should 
this future look like? What kind of country does Serbia want to be? 
The Agenda 2030 adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 2015 gives us 
an opportunity to open a society-wide dialogue to shape this vision. It 
sets 17 global sustainable development goals (SDG) and commits the 
193 countries that have subscribed to it, Serbia among them, to do their 
part to attain them. The countries have committed to “nationalize” the 
goals – meaning, specify goals for themselves that meet the criteria 
and work toward their realization. They have also committed to set 
national implementation and monitoring frameworks to accomplish the 
“nationalized” goals. The responsibility for their attainment is shared 
among all parts of society – not only the government but also the 
business community, academia, other stakeholders, and civil society.
 
To forge a vision, many questions need to be answered. How do we 
want our economy, society and environment to work and look like 
by 2030? Clearly, Serbia wants to be a “European country”, but the 
28 European Union member countries are all “European” in different 
ways. What do we want to improve most, what first? Were they to 
receive a windfall of one billion euros, each EU member country would 
have different priorities in spending them. What would be Serbia’s? A 
clear answer requires a shared understanding that can only be reached 
through a broad and thorough dialogue.
The present document sets a baseline for such a dialogue. It does not 
attempt to assess every one of the 169 targets through which the 17 
SDGs are formulated, and it is not organized goal by goal. Instead, it 
is a discussion of Serbia’s most important sustainable development 
challenges and the strengths it should build on – as we see them. We 
do not attempt to give answers to the above questions. However, we 
do not shy away from giving our views of the direction in which these 
answers should be sought, by being selective about the issues we 
discuss. Not everyone will agree. Even we may change our minds. That 
would mean the dialogue had been fruitful. 
We look forward to it!
Kori Udovicki
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suMMary
Nearly three decades since Serbia’s stormy transition begun, the 
country’s GDP per capita still stands below the 1989 level, and its human 
development is still catching up to its full potential. A new economy has, 
nevertheless, gradually developed which is reaching a significant size.
Serbia’s key development challenge is that only a small part of the 
economy built during socialism has been transformed into a new, 
modern economy. The new economy employs a very small share of 
the total population. To reach average European employment levels 
in decent jobs, today’s formal jobs in the private sector would need 
to be doubled (and this assumes all formal employment in Serbia is 
“decent”, which it is not). Raising employment to normal levels would 
go a very long way in reducing inequality and poverty to better-than-
average European levels, where they should be considering Serbia’s 
socialist past and current values. As it is, Serbia suffers some of the 
highest poverty and inequality rates in Europe, as well as one of the 
sharpest population declines.
The high levels of poverty and inequality would also be greatly 
alleviated if Serbia’s significant taxes and social transfers accomplished 
the significant redistributive effect they have in the European Union 
(EU). More needs to be done particularly for vulnerable groups and to 
protect minority rights, although in these regards significant advances 
were made over the past decade and a half. 
Economic growth does seem poised to accelerate in the coming 
period. The new economy has been growing on the foundations 
built in the past, driven by foreign investors as well as domestic 
mainly SME entrepreneurs. It is now finally reaching a size that can 
take the country forward. Importantly, since the 2009 crisis the 
new economy has been led by exports. Serbia’s opportunities lie 
in the three factors that have underpinned its conquest of export 
markets: fertile land and a long-standing agribusiness tradition, 
very solid and competitive mid-technology industrial know-how, 
and a self-mobilizing creative and knowledge-products community 
(especially in IT). 
Economic growth can be further spread and accelerated through 
“greening”, especially in rural areas. This requires a more coordinated 
and organized management of non-mineral natural resources, 
especially for eco- and health-related tourism, renewable energy 
production, and sustainable agriculture. 
One key challenge that the new economy needs to overcome is the 
need for integration. As it is, Serbia’s generally small companies often 
face global markets alone.
A particular challenge is also the highly inefficient management of 
the country’s resources, particularly in the energy sector. Serbia 
recycles only 34% of its generated waste (excluding mineral waste), 
lower than any EU member country, whose average stands at 75%. Its 
energy intensity is double that of the EU average, although it does 
not have a very large heavy industry. Serbia has no strategy for the 
time, expected not long after 2030, when the hydrocarbon reserves 
she presently relies on are depleted. 
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European values and the EU accession process firmly frame Serbia’s 
institutional and political goals as goals in and of themselves. However, 
the acceleration and greater sustainability of Serbia’s development 
requires a business environment that encourages entrepreneurship 
and investment.  Above all, this requires predictability—the rule of 
law and that priorities are more clearly set and maintained. Also, 
policy implementation requires that Serbia’s administration change 
practices that make its institutions particularly ineffective.The dialogue 
proposed here can contribute to overcoming these problems by linking 
institutional operation to specific desired results. 
Finally, it is at the community level that development reaches citizens. 
Serbia’s local communities provide basic needs at relatively high 
levels, but largely as a legacy of socialist times. Local and regional 
development is highly uneven and there is some evidence that the 
relatively high level of resource transfers carried out by the central 
government could be better targeted to have developmental 
effects. Local governments need greater autonomy, in order for local 
communities to come together in taking initiative and responsibility 
for accomplishing greater local-level results. 
Serbia’s development faces both challenges and opportunities.  Both 
need to be recognized by its citizens, business and other stakeholders 
of development.  They need to engage with Serbia’s national and local 
institutions to accelerate and make sustainable Serbia’s development. 
An SDG framework clearly linking goals to institutional capacities to 
deliver them, as intermediate targets, can greatly help in getting Serbia 
to become what its citizens want it to be.
background
the present document is a baseline review of serbia’s human 
development and environmental challenges as well as the assets and 
limitations it faces in advancing towards attainment of sustainable 
development goals (sdgs). It provides background information for the 
design of a society-wide dialogue to help shape Serbia’s nationalization 
of SDGs in line with its commitment to the UN 2030 Agenda. The 
document focuses on SDG dimensions, grouped in four pillars, that we 
consider key for Serbia’s human development, and it does not address 
existing policy goals or options, nor their implementation.
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Figure 1. SDG dimensions are grouped in four pillars – according to 
Serbia’s socio-economic development potential and issues.
Pillar I - “serbia’s Human development: dimensions and challenges” 
is dedicated to the dimensions of human development (Hd), largely 
covering the issues under Goals 1-5 and 10 (poverty, hunger, health, 
education and inequality), as well as overall income generation capacity 
and particularly employment (Goal 8, emphasis on 8.5). We start the 
review focusing on issues related to income generation capacity, 
because that is by far the lowest ranked dimension (84th in the world) 
of Serbia’s human development index (which ranks 66th overall).
Pillar II - “Prosperity on a green corner of the planet: assets and 
challenges” refers to the serbia’s assets and constraints, which 
represent the starting point for fostering quality economic growth, 
i.e., accomplishing Goal 8. We organize these assets and constraints 
roughly along the logic of economic factors of production, but also 
“mainstreaming” the fact that economic growth needs to be such as to 
meet not only the targets under Goal 8, but also Goal 9 (focusing on 
infrastructure, industrialization and innovation), Goal 7 (energy), parts 
of Goal 6 (water management), Goal 12 (sustainable production and 
consumption), and Goal 15 (forests and biodiversity). 
Pillar III - “Institutional capacity and Partnership” deals with the 
role of institutions, and particularly with their capacity to deliver 
the sdgs. As Serbia’s values and aspirations with regards to the 
development of its institutions are firmly framed in its European 
path, in general, nationalized Goal 16 should closely follow the 
results framework adopted in the EU Accession context. In as far 
as these goals are goals in and of themselves, the EU’s progress 
reports’ assessments are comprehensive. Therefore, we focus on 
institutional effectiveness and the system’s capacity to deliver 
desired development results.
Pillar Iv - “Prosperous and Healthy communities” covers issues 
related to delivering human development at the community level. 
Essentially, this is a cross-cutting approach that presently incorporates 
questions of territorial distribution of powers, management of 
regional/territorial development and the extent to which the basic 
human development needs and resilience are met at the local level 
{parts of SDG 6 (clean water and sanitation) and SDG 11 (sustainable 
cities and communities)}. 
PILAR II 
prosperity on 
a green corner 
of the planet: 
assets and 
challenges
PILAR III 
partnership, 
peace, democracy 
and institutions
PILAR IV 
prosperous 
and healthy 
communities
PILAR I 
serbia’s human 
development: 
dimensions and 
challenges
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PIllar I – serbIa’s HuMan 
develoPMent: dIMensIons 
and cHallenges
over the past few years, serbia has ranked 66th in the world in 
terms of human development – lower than any EU member country 
and Montenegro, and above Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(B&H). There is little doubt that this ranking is substantially lower than 
such comparisons would have shown thirty years ago. Serbia’s human 
development imploded in the 1990s and has not been able fully to 
recover since, because of the very gradual recovery and transformation 
of the economy. Hence, Serbia has not been able to keep pace with the 
countries it compares itself with. This matters to our analysis because 
the challenges and opportunities that Serbia faces often differ from 
what would be expected in a country that arrived at a similar level of 
human development while never having been better off. It also matters 
because it frames Serbia’s citizens’ expectations, affecting both their 
wellbeing and economic behaviour.
• Serbia’S human development lieS 
Well beloW Its PotentIal.
Figure 2. Serbia is one of the lowest ranked European countries in terms of the level of human 
development, as measured by the HDI.
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• it iS in the income dimenSion of 
tHe HdI coMPonents tHat serbIa 
ranks loWest.
In terms of a decent standard of living (gdP pc), serbia ranks the 
lowest (88th), mostly because it has the lowest total employment 
level in europe. Employment among the working-age population (15-
64 years) in Serbia is only 55%, compared to 67% for the EU28 and the 
NMS on average. In addition, too many jobs in Serbia are of low quality 
(more than a quarter (700,000) of the total employed (2,719,000) 
hold informal jobs), and quantity (e.g., low work intensity). The 
productivity of the employed part of the population is low but closer 
to that of comparable countries. For example, Serbia’s total production 
per formally employed is higher than Bulgaria’s, but because its 
employment rate is 15% (8 pp) higher and its vulnerable employment 
is 68% (18 pp) lower, Bulgaria’s GDP per capita is 38% higher as well. If 
Serbia had had the same employment level as Bulgaria in 2015 (63.5% 
of working-age population) and a similar employment structure – 
keeping Serbia’s current productivity for each employment segment 
unchanged – her GDP/capita would have been higher than Bulgaria’s.
Figure 3. Serbia’s GDP per capita (4,905 euros) is among the lowest in Europe, and it stands 
nearly 40% below that of Bulgaria, the lowest among EU member states.
serbia
4.904
nms average
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bulgaria
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Source: Eurostat, SORS
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Figure 4. The key problem is an exceptionally low total employment level, and especially of the 
decent kind.
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Figure 5. Full employment in decent jobs requires an increase of almost 75% (1.45 million) in the 
current number of formal jobs – to employ the unemployed, the discouraged, and those working 
informally.
Source: CEVES’ calculations on Eurostat and SORS data.Source: Eurostat, SORS, World Bank
nms 11 - employment 66% of working-age  |  vulnerable employment 8% of working-age
czech republic - employment 72% of working-age  |  vulnerable employment 9.9% of working-age
serbia - employment 55.2% of working-age  |  vulnerable employment 14.6% of working-age
romania - employment 61.6% of working-age  |  vulnerable employment 17.2% of working-age
bulgaria - employment 63.4% of working-age  |  vulnerable employment 5.4% of working-age
eu 28 - employment 66.6% of working-age  |  vulnerable employment 7.9% of working-age
*Full employment assumes 
„no unemployment“, which at 
present would require 490k 
new jobs. However, assessment 
implies additional activation of 
340k discouraged workers, 
in order to reach EU28 activi-
ty rate (72%). On top of that, 
it is assumed that 600k out 
of 700k informal jobs cannot 
be considered as decent and 
should be transformed.
++ + =
* All of the above information refers to working age population (aged between 15-64).
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• economic growth haS recently 
accelerated, led by a sMall but 
coMPetItIve and exPort-orIented 
neW econoMy.
serbia’s economic structure can be divided into two segments: 
traditional and new, which exhibit different business paradigms and 
performance. By “traditional economy”, we denote the untransformed 
state-owned or socialist-owned sector. By “new economy”, we 
mean the private corporate sector – including fully transformed 
privatized companies. The new economy emerged gradually from the 
transformation of a small share of the resources built in socialist times 
and new investments. While the comparative productivity of the new 
economy that has developed since the 1990s is undoubtedly closer to 
historical expectations, it is the high level of inactivity or low-intensity 
employment, as well as the low productivity of the large and slowly 
transforming traditional economy, that pull Serbia’s GDP down.
trends since the global crisis are indicate that serbia has finally 
turned towards export orientaton while the exit of unsustianable 
tradition companies has recently accelerated. The new economy has 
finally reached a sufficient size to determine the pace of the country’s 
growth. It is now supported by the strong growth of the European 
economy and a balanced macroeconomic framework, after the recent 
fiscal consolidation. The new economy’s exports are based primarily 
on the rich land and agricultural tradition of Serbia, mid-technology 
industrial know-how, and IT and other knowledge-based services.
Figure 6. Only exports of the new economy grew throughout the period, reaching 93% of total 
exports in 2015 and indicating that the transformation of the economy is in its final stage.
2005
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
2008 20112006
other traditional 
including privatised
fca & železara de novo -
domestic
de novo - 
foreign
services
2009 2012 20142007 2010 2013 2015
Source: CEVES’ calculations on Cube Administration
e
x
p
o
r
t
 (
m
il
 e
u
r
)
24 25
• Serbia’S StrongeSt human devel-
oPMent asPect Is Its educatIon-
al attaInMent (55tH), Measured by 
quantIty – years oF scHoolIng. 
thanks to greater educational system coverage and demographic 
changes, the educational level is rising. In 2015, about 71% of people 
over 25 years of age completed at least upper secondary education – 
77% of men and 65% of women. At this level, Serbia still ranks below the 
NMSEU (81.7%) but is catching up with them.
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Figure 7. Educational coverage is similar to EU levels, while the educational level is rising
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• the  quality of education doeS 
not Fully  PrePare youtH For 
today’s labor Market – eItHer as 
eMPloyees or as entrePreneurs.
citizens of serbia are, on average, still less educated than the citizens 
of new eu member countries. Serbia’s participation in PISA 2012 
shows that the country faces problems with educational outcomes. For 
example, in mathematics, Serbia ranked 42nd in a group of 65 countries, 
according to OECD data. With such a ranking, Serbia was well below 
all PISA-participating European countries except for Bulgaria, Romania, 
and Montenegro.
the education system has not yet adapted to the major changes of 
the 21 century, although the recent expansion of It curricula is an 
important step in the right direction. The fundamental problem is that 
curricula are still designed for old-fashioned rote learning, rather than 
to teach students to think – which leads to the issue of either a high 
share of unemployment, or poor quality and unsustainable employment. 
Examples of schools that have succeeded to adapt curricula to labor 
market requirements and needs are limited, and progress is colud be 
faster – too many students are trained in skills that are not employable 
any more. In the current economic environment this is even more 
pronounced, since the chances for youth to be employed are three times 
lower, while the quality of jobs for those who are employed often does not 
meet the criteria of the definition of “decent work”. The unemployment 
rate among students who have graduated is around 42% in Serbia, while 
almost a half of employed youth are informally employed. According to 
Figure 8. Education outcomes are still weak – with low expenditure likely playing an important role. 
the official Labor force survey in Serbia, 20.8 % of employed youth are 
estimated to be engaged on a part-time basis. On the other hand, 18.8% 
of youth are over-qualified for the work they perform.
one of the key reasons for the relatively weak outcomes could probably 
be found in the low level of public expenditure for education. In Serbia, 
this expenditure is around 4.2% of GDP, which is significantly lower than 
the EU average (5.2% of GDP) and NEUMS average (4.6% of GDP). Bearing 
in mind that expenditure for higher education is similar to the EU average, 
and that since private primary and secondary education in Serbia has 
not yet become fully developed, we can conclude that total educational 
expenditure (both private and public) to even greater extent negatively 
deviates from the EU average. The only comparable countries that spend 
less than Serbia are the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania.
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• health iS ranked low, eSpecially 
consIderIng tHe strong yugoslav 
legacy, reFlectIng overall InstI-
tutIonal Weaknesses. 
serbian citizens’ health is poorer (69th) than expected given the 
level of socio-economic development, funding and the strong legacy 
in the health care system. Among the key indicators of overall health 
attainment, the most comprehensive and one of the most telling 
indicators of the general health status of a country’s population is the life-
expectancy indicator. According to WHO estimates, the life expectancy 
at birth indicator in Serbia in 2015 was 75.6 years, which was shorter 
than that of any EU member state or other former Yugoslav republic, 
except for Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania. One of the highest 
‘out-of-pocket’ health care payments by citizens, an unnecessarily high 
mortality rate, a lack of strategic documents and the unresolved role of 
the private sector paint a picture of unresolved systemic issues.
the infrastructure of the health system changed little over several 
decades despite market changes in demographics and in the health 
prioriteies, resulting in limited institutional effectiveness. For example, 
Serbia’s health care system has performed well with regard to infectious 
diseases based on systems established decades ago. On the other 
hand, systems and programs for the prevention of non-communicable 
diseases have not been developed commensurably. Cancer, diabetes 
and heart diseases mortality rates are high, even in situations where 
highly effective prevention measures are available.
Figure 9: There is a marked disproportion between Serbia’s total level of spending (% of GDP) on 
health, by the government and out-of-pocket, and the level of its citizens’ life expectancy. 
S
w
ed
en
P
o
rt
u
g
al
C
y
p
ru
s
D
en
m
ar
k
G
re
ec
e
L
at
vi
a
G
er
m
an
y
U
K
M
o
n
te
n
eg
ro
M
al
ta
Ir
el
an
d
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d
It
al
y
L
it
h
u
an
ia
B
el
g
iu
m
S
lo
va
ki
a
R
o
m
an
ia
A
u
st
ri
a
S
p
ai
n
E
st
o
n
ia
N
o
rw
ay
C
ze
ch
F
ra
n
ce
S
lo
ve
n
ia
M
ac
ed
o
n
ia
s
er
b
ia
C
ro
at
ia
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
B
u
lg
ar
ia
P
o
la
n
d
F
in
la
n
d
H
u
n
g
ar
y
14.00 84.00
12.00
10.00
82.00
8.00
80.00
6.00
78.00
4.00
76.00
2.00
74.00
0.00 72.00
health expenditures (private & public, % gdp) and outcomes (life expectancy in years)
Source: WHO, Batut Institute
private expenditures (% of gdp)
(left axis)
public expenditures (% of gdp)
(left axis)
life-expectancy (years)
(right axis)
l
if
e
 -
 e
x
p
e
c
ta
n
c
y
p
r
iv
a
t
e
 a
n
d
 p
u
b
l
ic
 (
%
 o
f
 g
d
p
)
30 31
• poverty and inequality remain 
HIgH, due to tHe loW eMPloyMent 
level and loW re-dIstrIbutIve eF-
Fect oF FIscal PolIcIes.
relative poverty in serbia is among the highest in europe, leaving 
many people behind. As much as 25% of people in Serbia earn less 
than 60% of the median income. Absolute poverty is also high, since as 
much as 7.3% of the population, or about half a million, is estimated to 
fall below the conservatively set absolute poverty line in 2016. Still, it is 
important to note that there are some positive trends. In the past ten 
years the more extreme measure of poverty – the population whose 
consumption falls below 80% of the poverty line—did halve, from 4% 
to 2%. Also, measures of poverty based on access to consumption 
put Serbia in a better position. Measured by material deprivation in 
dimensions such as the level of education, health and standard of living 
(access to electricity, drinking water, sanitation, living space, access to 
information – radio, tv, telephone), the poverty rate in Serbia amounted 
to 19.5% in 2016, which is better than a few EU member countries (such 
as Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania), and has been gradually declining 
since 2010. The rate of inequality is similar to European averages, but 
not improving, as recent research has indicated
Figure 10: Every fourth person in Serbia is below the relative poverty line (i.e., earns less than 60% 
of median income) – one of the highest shares in Europe. 
the primary reason behind the high levels of poverty and inequality is 
the low decent employment rate. Also, the low re-distributive effect of 
fiscal policies does not do enough to improve the status of those that fall 
behind. Social transfers reduce inequality to a lesser extent than in the 
EU: social assistance and child allowances are only 0.6% of GDP vs the 
average of 1.1% of GDP in EU countries, while pensions, which amount 
to a very large share of GDP (11.5% in 2016) have limited redistributive 
effects because they themselves are unequal, and not universal.
czech 9.7%
slovakia 12.3%
hungary 14.9%
poland 17.6%
bulgaria 22.0%
serbia 25.4%
romania 25.4%
Source: Eurostat, SORS
below poverty line above poverty line
relative poverty line
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• vulnerable population groupS 
are PartIcularly aFFected by Pov-
erty and InequalIty oF access.
there are some particularly vulnerable population groups that present 
particular challenges and deserve special attention with regard to 
their human development: These are women, persons with disabilities, 
internally displaced persons, Roma, young people, the rural population 
and the elderly. 
gender equality has been established by law, but inequality still 
persists, roughly in line or somewhat more than european levels, in 
employment, earnings, executive power, as well as in the perception of 
the role of women in the Serbian society. Not only are men more likely 
to be employed, but there is a more striking gap between men’s and 
women’s earnings. In jobs with the same characteristics (education, 
work experience, profession, industry sector, etc.), women earn about 
11% less than men. In other words, women in Serbia practically work for 
free as of the 23rd of November onwards. 
the roma remain side-lined in social life as the least educated and 
poorest social group; they often live in unsanitary settlements and 
face discrimination in many spheres of social life. Notable advances 
have been made thanks to the implementation of the previous Roma 
Inclusion Strategy, and it will be important to keep this same focus in 
the period covered by the new Strategy: 2016-2020. 
although serbia has made some progress, and the rate of that 
inequality is similar to european averages, in order to achieve the 
goals of equal opportunities for all categories of the population, as 
well as the absence of any discrimination, it is important to conduct 
systematic and continuous monitoring in the period ahead.
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• Serbia faceS  one of the faSteSt 
rates oF PoPulatIon declIne In 
euroPe. 
We conclude the Hd review with a big and worrisome issue not 
explicitly covered by the sdgs: the strong negative population 
growth, which is the most intractable long-term challenge. According 
to projections, the population of Serbia is likely to decrease by 8% 
by 2031 and by 12% by 2041 – and substantially more in the region 
of Southern and Eastern Serbia. This, in and of itself, will affect the 
sustainability of economic growth as it could increase decent job wages 
faster than productivity. It is also certain to threaten the sustainability 
of the pension system. This issue needs to be studied much more and 
come to be better understood, through comprehensive scenarios.
Figure 11: Assuming that current demographic trends continue, Serbia’s population is likely to 
shrink by almost 600.000 (8%) citizens by 2030.
Source: SORS
population (2016): 1.868.269
change 2031/2016 (%): -11.1
change 2041/2016 (%): -17.2
vojvodina
population (2016): 1.690.375
change 2031/2016 (%): 4.7
change 2041/2016 (%): 8.0
belgrade
2016
2031
2041
population (2016): 1.947.915
change 2031/2016 (%): -11.0
change 2041/3016 (%): -15.3
šumadija and western serbia
population (2016): 1.535.040
change 2031/2016 (%): -15.0
change 2041/2016 (%): -24.6
eastern and southern serbia
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PIllar II – ProsPerIty 
on a green corner oF 
tHe Planet: assets and 
cHallenges
• Serbia’S SuStainable develop-
Ment oPPortunItIes lIe In tHe very 
strengtHs tHat today drIve Its 
exPort groWtH.
By export growth drivers, we refer to the economic structures that 
the country can rely on, or develop, in order to achieve quality 
growth more quickly, as manifested by existing economic activity 
and the resources it is based on. These include natural assets such as 
agricultural land, tourism and mineral resources, capital, physical and 
other infrastructure, skills and knowledge (human capital), as well as 
broader concepts of “resources” such as access to capital and global 
markets, entrepreneurship and social trust.
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• Serbia can become an agri-
Food PoWerHouse and lIFt Its 
rural areas out oF Poverty and 
IsolatIon.
the agri-food sector in serbia is more important to the economy than 
it is in any other european country, contributing 10.7% of GDP and 
employing 120,000 people formally, or over 600,000 in total (formally 
and informally) – almost a quarter of the total employed. This is 
underpinned by the relative abundance of agricultural land, favorable 
climate conditions, a long tradition, and deep linkages of Serbia’s 
population (both rural and urban) to the land. Moreover, inelastic 
domestic demand saved the sector from deeper destruction in the 
1990s and favorable trade agreements give it further support today. 
Access to land in Serbia is very broad, and while poverty is higher in 
rural areas, hunger and malnutrition are social safety net and health-
related issues; in other words, food security is not a problem for the 
population.
Figure 12. The contribution of the agri-food sector to GDP and total employment in Serbia is 
exceptionally high. 
serbia has long been a net exporter of food and today is ranked 9th in 
this respect in europe (out of 36 countries and 13 net food exporters in 
total). It exports primary agricultural products, processed food, beverages 
and tobacco products. These together account for 16% of Serbia’s total 
exports of goods in 2017 and have shown a tendency to be strongly 
competitive in recent years. Since 2009, agri-food exports have expanded 
by 1.325 million euros, 70% of which was due to expanding market share in 
more than 60 countries (960 million euros, 45% of which was due to new 
market share, excluding tobacco products). However, around two-thirds 
of this expansion has come from just five low value-added agricultural 
products: corn, wheat, raspberries, apples, and animal feed.
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Figure 13. Serbia is among the top 10 European net exporters of agricultural and food products. the potential of the agri-food sector to expand decent employment 
needs to be further explored but it is undoubtedly large – on the 
condition that some important challenges are overcome. The key 
challenges that need to be tackled are the fragmentation of land and 
the characteristics of food processing, which tends to be carried out 
mostly by small to medium-sized enterprises (SME). Serbia’s average 
yields per hectare of cultivated land are 37% lower than the EU average, 
but this is because 70% of the landholdings are smaller than 5 hectares 
and further fragmented into, on average, four to five parts. Most of 
these farms use obsolete traditional methods, or marginal engagement 
of family labor. Many of them are elderly. In addition, 11% of arable land 
lies unused (out of which 80% south of Vojvodina).
 
at the same time, serbia has a growing number of highly productive 
farms and companies, especially in the fruit and vegetable sector — 
such as Van Drunnen (dried fruits), Inter-funghi (dried vegetables), 
Marbo (canned vegetables) and Nectar (juices). If a substantial part 
of the former type of agriculture producer is transformed into the 
latter kind, Serbia has great scope for adding value and increasing 
its productivity. The challenge is less on the production side, where 
relatively small farms and businesses can be used effectively to reduce 
poverty and generate employment. As the Italian example shows, the 
shortcomings can be overcome with cooperation. However, on the side 
of market management, it is imperative that Serbia become able to 
consolidate its presence on global markets, under terms that favor its 
producers.
Source: CEVES’ calculations on SBRA data
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• a Strong engineering and 
MetalWorkIng tradItIon Is gIvIng 
rIse to a recovery In tHe MId- and 
MId-to-HIgH level tecHnology 
IndustrIes.
serbia has the engineering/technical skills to underpin the 
development of a productive, modern, high-income generating 
industry. Know-how and skills underlie the current fast growth of some 
mid-level technological manufacturing industries, generating decent 
jobs based both on foreign investment and a vibrant — if small — SME 
community. 
• Not surprisingly, more than 40% of Serbia’s merchandise exports 
is carried out by large foreign direct investment (FDI) companies. 
The most convincing comparative advantage is exhibited in the 
fast-growing rubber and plastics (R&P) industry, with exports by 
large, well-established foreign companies (Michelin, Cooper Tire). In 
addition, companies producing electrical equipment and machinery 
— such as home appliances (Gorenje), wind generators (Siemens), 
and engine parts (Albon/Agena) – have also exhibited a high level of 
competitiveness. Despite being very large exporters, FDI companies 
in the apparel, automobile and steel industries are still creating 
comparatively little added value. They have been the recipients of 
massive government subsidies, and while the value added in the 
exports of these industries has certainly been increasing, there is no 
clear sign of sustained growth in the exports of any of these sectors.
• Domestically owned SMEs have also been able to find their place on 
international markets, with a share of 25% of total merchandise exports 
(overwhelmingly by newly started companies) and well over a half of 
that is made by small or micro firms. About a third of domestic SME 
exports consist of agri-food products; the rest comes from all industries, 
but with more noticeable shares for rubber and plastics, fabricated 
metal products, machinery, and furniture and wood products. 
serbia also faces limitations that would need to be very carefully 
addressed to ensure quality growth. High quality technical and 
experienced skills are not abundant, while process and market 
management skills are, in fact, rather limited. Together with the 
limitations faced by the largely SME domestic economy – i.e., the lack 
of access to capital and know-how, as well as internal organizational 
and motivational limitations — there is a real risk that these industries 
will continue to employ only a relatively small share of the total 
workforce. Whether their expansion is sustained and whether they 
generate a significant number of decent jobs critically depends on the 
effectiveness of Serbia’s education and science services as well as the 
society’s/government’s capacity to attract quality foreign investment 
and support the sustained growth of its SMEs. Critical in this regard is 
greatly improving the business environment.
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• Some very highly-Skilled gra-
duates tHat stay In serbIa are 
gIvIng rIse to a HIgH-knoWledge 
content servIce Industry.
a particular opportunity for serbia to catch up exists in the high-
knowledge content service and intangible creative products industries, 
especially in the context of Industry 4.0. It is significant that a larger 
share of Serbia’s economy is comprised of these products/services than 
in Europe on average. Export of these products & services has been 
growing by 10% annually since 2009, while net export growth has been 
particularly high from 2013 (annual growth rate of 32% from 2013 to 
2017). Professional services and especially high-tech knowledge, largely 
computer programing, have been particularly competitive and are 
growing fast. By 2011, this segment began noticeably to affect the total, 
especially net service exports. This is clearly because Serbia’s highly 
trained graduates have less opportunities to obtain employment in other 
industries. However, it also represents an undoubtable comparative 
advantage. The question is how far this industry can spread and absorb 
the currently unemployed or under-employed labor? This potential has 
not, to our knowledge, been gauged yet. It is clear, nevertheless, that the 
sustained expansion of these services and products critically depends 
on the effectiveness of Serbia’s education and science services as well 
as on policies and collective actions that can ensure that exports shift 
from a low-wage to high-productivity basis.
Figure 14b. Domestic enterprises — specially small and medium ones, significantly contributed to 
export growth of majority of manufacturing sectors.*
* Manufacturing of motor vehicles and basic metals is excluded from this observation.Source: CEVES’ calculations on SBRA data
Figure 14a. Export growth of mid- and mid-to-high level technology industry has been dynamic 
since the crisis.*
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Figure 15. The export of services – especially computer programming – is growing fast.
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• a multitude of green growth 
oPPortunItIes lay unexPloIted 
and could ProvIde tHe edge 
needed to lIFt sustaInably serbIa’s 
develoPMent to a HIgHer level. 
serbia is moderately rich in non-mineral natural resources that offer 
much needed, mostly green, development opportunities, particularly 
for rural areas. In particular, Serbia has a reasonably large and relatively 
low-quality forest cover, plentiful water resources (although 92% 
comes from external flows, making this resource vulnerable) and quite 
rich geothermal resources.  
These lay the foundations for several sources of increased and green 
income.  Income from the growing rural tourism could be increased 
substantially further if it was “greened”—relying on increased protection 
of Serbia’s substantial biodiversity, on ethno-content connected to 
sustainable agriculture content, and on the sustainable exploitation 
of geothermal waters (spas).  Furthermore, the development of 
renewable energy sources—particularly, biomass from agriculture and 
forests, and solar energy—could boost both economic growth and 
stakeholder cooperation within local communities, increasing their 
social, economic and environmental resilience.   Source: CEVES’ calculations on NBS data
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organic, or at least natural, farming of land, is also a green way to 
substantially increase the value of serbia’s agri-food industry, and 
its developmental potential needs to be studied further. It is likely 
that it would increase the environmental sustainability of agriculture 
and reduce chemical pollution of water. Most importantly, it may be a 
way to increase the economic sustainability of cultivation on Serbia’s 
very small farms. Also, while the use of GMO seeds and products is 
regulated so as to facilitate a very belated membership in the WTO, 
Serbia’s non-GMO food tradition and capacity needs to be harnessed 
for increased export value-added: this primarily refers to cereal- and 
oil-based products - fodder, soybean oil or other segments of the mill 
and confectionery industry.
better management and policy coordination are much more important 
to improved exploitation of natural resources than increased financing, 
although the latter is more often cited as a need. In particular, there 
is almost no integrated management of water and forest resources, 
although an integrated approach to each, and coordination between the 
two, could go a very long way in improving outcomes across a broad range 
of issues—from climate mitigation, to water quality, biodiversity and non-
agricultural land use. Only 6,8% of Serbia’s territory is under protection 
(Slovenia has 53.6%, Croatia 37.7%, Macedonia 9.7%, Montenegro 4.1%, 
B&H 1.3%). Just to illustrate the potential of better environmental 
management — total value of fly-fishing tourism in upper Soča region 
in Slovenia (population around 5.000) is 2 million EUR every year. In 
addition, an important problem is that the majority of Serbia’s natural 
resources are managed by public enterprises.  Their management suffers 
from well- known problems of efficiency and, of great importance in this 
case, lack of transparency and participation.  Moreover, environmental 
sustainability is not one of their major objectives.
• eu environmental regulationS 
regardIng transParency, IMPact 
assessMent, and tHe cIrcular 
econoMy Have largely been ad-
oPted, but are all too oFten not 
IMPleMented. 
serbia’s eu membership aspirations set the highest standards globally 
for its environmental quality. It is well understood that Serbia may 
not have the financial means to implement them in the near future. 
However, much progress can be attained, as well as more funding 
secured, by a more  consistent and participatory monitoring of the 
quality of air and water, and environmental impact assessments, and 
identification of polluters. While the necessary regulations are mostly in 
place, environmental impact assessments need to be conducted more 
thoroughly, be of higher quality, and be treated consequently.  This 
is particularly true of licensing the construction of mini-hydroelectric 
power plants which is threatening the existence of 350 km of rivers 
and biodiversity in them, most of them in scenic, some even protected, 
areas. Only a small number of industrial polluters treat their waste 
waters, and by far most of the large polluters are actually under state 
ownership (the thermal power plants, the mines around Bor and 
Sjenica as well as Kolubara). Finally, the legacy of historical pollution 
to be cleaned is huge.
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• Serbia waSteS energy that could 
be Put In tHe servIce oF sustaIn-
able develoPMent as Well as 
contrIbute to MItIgatIng clIMate 
cHange.
decisive action to manage its energy resources more deliberately 
and economically would contribute to a broad array of development 
goals in serbia as well as improve its energy security. Serbia’s energy 
efficiency, at half the EU average level, is lower than any EU member 
country. In other words, Serbia could maintain its present economic 
performance and human development while using about half as much 
energy as it uses today. Yet, contrary to widespread belief, Serbia is not 
an energy rich country. The hydrocarbon reserves on which it presently 
relies for about 60% of its energy consumption will be depleted soon 
after 2030. Serbia does not have a clear strategy for dealing with this 
problem at present. Whatever strategy Serbia chooses to take, it will 
involve serious hikes in electric energy prices, to pay for imports or for 
replacement capacity. The longer that Serbia delays determining this 
strategy, the steeper the price hike will be, the more crucial it will be to 
straighten the system for safeguarding the most vulnerable segment 
of the population from it. 
Figure 16. Serbia has the lowest electricity price and the second highest energy intensity among 
comparable countries.
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certainly, an avenue that deserves urgent and open investigation is the 
potential for increased reliance on renewable energy resources (rer). 
These are currently assessed conservatively, under the assumption 
of the continued absence of structural change in the electric energy 
production/distribution system over the medium to long term. In view 
of the expected depletion of domestic hydrocarbons, and their unlikely 
full replacement from Kosovo coal, structural change will happen and 
needs to be planned and prepared for. In addition to the likely higher 
potential for wind and solar power than is currently envisaged in the 
country’s energy strategy, the use of wood as biofuel needs to be 
carefully explored. On the one hand, generating biomass for renewable 
energy, including wood, holds great economic potential. On the other, 
presently much consists of heating based on traditional wood stoves 
which have negative health effects. Moreover, Serbia does not have 
institutional systems that ensure the wood consumed is being duly 
replaced.
• while Serbia’S geoStrategic 
PosItIon Is an oPPortunIty, otHer 
cross-cuttIng Issues are largely 
cHallenges.
serbia’s very favorable geostrategic position with a tradition of 
cultural ties and entrepot trade, now free trade agreements with the 
EU but also Russia and the SEE region represent a major opportunity. 
It could be better supported by the transport infrastructure, which is, 
nevertheless, not quite a limitation to growth. 
on the negative side, the culture, and particularly the public 
administration, are not very friendly towards entrepreneurship. There 
is an overall low level of social capital and mutual trust. Together with 
the low predictability and high costs of the regulatory environment 
(more in the next chapter) all together these represent substantial 
obstacles to the thriving entrepreneurship and investment needed to 
accelerate Serbia’s development. Finally, neither the government nor 
general public have yet begun to promote awareness and implement 
regulations concerning the need for more sustainable production 
and consumption patterns overall, as well as to mitigate and adapt to 
climate change.  And yet, these are not only good for the environment, 
but for economic sustainability over the longer run.
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PIllar III – InstItutIonal 
caPacIty and PartnersHIP
serbia’s values and aspirations with regard to institutional and political 
development are firmly framed by its european union accession path. 
The reforms envisaged are not only about aligning with the Acquis, 
which most often determines rules about “how” something can, 
or cannot, be done. They are also about alignment with European 
values. European values set the highest goals regarding democracy, 
fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, institutional quality, and peace 
and security. The EU’s accession priorities for Serbia in these areas, 
and their mapping into the targets under SDG 16 are shown on Table 
1. It can be seen that the EU accession targets can be viewed as a 
maximum-standard interpretation of SDG 16. 
Progress on attaining the entire list of institutional goals is monitored 
by the European Commission (EC) in its annual Progress Reports. This 
is a complex exercise that assesses progress in outcomes as well as the 
reform steps planned to accomplish them. It is a comprehensive effort 
that takes very significant resources and Serbia is fortunate to have the 
EC investing in it. 
• the eu’S prioritieS for Serbia’S 
accessIon In tHe PolItIcal and 
InstItutIonal realM aMount to 
goal 16 natIonalIzed In lIne WItH 
tHe HIgHest global standards. 
sdg 16 – targets
SDG Target 16.7
Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and 
representative decision making at all levels
Strengthen democratic institution oversight (especially 
by the parliament); strengthen CSOs as well as their 
cooperation with public institutions; 
Ensure fundamental rights, protection of minorities 
(Roma, LGBTI persons); improve access to justice; 
implement antidiscrimination policies; improve 
transparency of EU media standards - media freedom 
and pluralism.
Improve judicial independence, impartiality and efficiency; 
strengthen professionalism of judges, prosecutors and 
court administrators through merit-based criteria; reduce 
the duration of proceedings; Improve the consistency of 
jurisprudence.
Implement an effective system of prevention and fight 
against corruption, enable a legal framework; strengthen 
the capacities and efficiency of the relevant bodies 
(especially the Anti-Corruption Agency); implement an 
effective system for the protection of whistle-blowers.
Implement an integrated approach to organized crime; 
improve the capacity of policy for investigations; 
implement a centralized criminal intelligence system; 
improve inter-agency cooperation; enhance the 
protection of witnesses in organized crime cases and 
victims of human trafficking; implement an integrated 
border management (IBM) approach and improve risk 
assessment, data collection and databases systems.
Enhance the coordination of public administration (PA) 
reforms and establish a policy coordination, planning and 
development system; put into place a civil service system 
based on merit; improve PA governance and service 
delivery; enhance macroeconomic stability through 
multilateral surveillance and implementation of the 
Economic Reform Programme; reform public financial 
management; reform customs, tax administration, and 
statistics to meet acquis requirements. 
SDG Target 16.10
Ensure public access to information and protect 
fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national 
legislation and international agreements
SDG Target 16.3
Promote the rule of law at the national and international 
levels and ensure equal access to justice for all
SDG Target 16.5
Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their 
forms
SDG Target 16.1
Significantly reduce all forms of violence and related 
death rates everywhere
SDG Target 16.2
End abuse, exploitation, trafficking and all forms of 
violence against and torture of children
SDG Target 16.4
By 2030, significantly reduce illicit financial and arms 
flows, strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets 
and combat all forms of organized crime
SDG Target 16.6
Develop effective, accountable and transparent 
institutions at all levels
SDG Target 16.9
By 2030, provide a legal identity for all, including birth 
registration
eu Indicative country strategy Paper for serbia for 
Instrument of Pre-accession assistance 2014-2020 - 
expected results
Table 1. Mapping SDG 16 Targets to the EU’s accession priorities for Serbia
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• good inStitutionS matter alSo 
In order to better attaIn all tHe 
otHer sIxteen sdgs
Most of the institutional reforms are planned in order to establish 
European values as a way of life — they are goals in and of themselves. 
However, many of them are also very much needed as an instrument, to 
create an environment and develop the institutional capacity necessary 
to put Serbia on a faster and more sustainable development path.  Of 
key importance to this are; 1) Establishing a business environment that 
is supportive of thriving investment and entrepreneurship. Above all, 
such an environment requires predictability, the rule of law, including 
clear rules defining market relations, and stability of policies and 
regulations; 2) Meaningful policy planning but also stable and consistent 
policy implementation are needed for the accomplishment of any long-
term results; 3) The design of good policies requires transparency and 
significant stakeholder involvement and participation; 4) Finally, the 
public administration needs to be capable of delivering the policies 
that the government may choose to adopt – i.e. it needs a measure of 
effectiveness.
The above issues have been amply studied and argued, especially 
in documents linked to the EU accession process and by the World 
Bank. according to in-depth expert assessment methods, serbia’s 
administrative effectiveness is somewhat above the lower end of 
the preparedness of new eu member states before they acceded 
to european union membership. Indices that heavily rely on citizen/
stakeholder perception assess the quality of Serbia’s institutions lower. 
This may be because Serbia’s stakeholders have higher expectations. 
However, of particular concern to this exercise are that policy 
prioritization (at the heart of policy planning), as well as its effective 
implementation can be particularly difficult even when all the 
necessary conditions typically assessed by experts—such as regulatory 
framework and civil service capacity – are present. 
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• too often the StatuS quo winS 
over ProclaIMed PolIcy PrIorItIes.
serbia has real difficulty in setting policy priorities, and there is a risk 
that this may invalidate the present sdg nationalization exercise, as it 
so many other plans. Serbia has many strategies and policy planning 
documents, and most of them tend to present too many issues 
as priorities to constitute true guidance for policy actions. Actual 
policy priorities are revealed in policy implementation – when some 
actions and stakeholders receive more funding and attention than 
others. However, by this measure, it can be said that major shifts in 
policies have generally been rare over the past decades, and that few 
policy priorities stand out as priorities. Nor have policy changes been 
accomplished through consistent incremental change over several 
years. Serbia’s development policies have tended to revolve around 
the status quo: every budget year the departures from last year’s 
budget have tended to be marginal and/or unsystematic.
the inclination to preserve the status-quo is particularly visible in 
the provision of public services. Certainly, it is notable that Serbia’s 
public system structures, both the physical and the organizational 
ones have changed very little over several decades, even though the 
demographic, socio-economic and political changes in the meantime 
have been vast. One reason for the strong entrenchment of the status 
quo is that those interested in it, or too concerned to risk change, tend 
to be better organized. Another is possibly lack of clear information 
and credibility of what could be accomplished through change.  
all too often public service provision is adjusted to the needs of those 
providing the services, rather than the needs of the beneficiaries. 
Take the example of the education system. It has been clear for some 
time now that secondary school curricula are much too fragmented, 
that high-school pupils cannot learn well if they have 10-15 subjects per 
year. Yet, a fundamental change in the way the curriculum is organized 
is hard to imagine, not least because it would require both a change in 
the way teachers become qualified to teach particular subjects, and a 
reduction in the number of high-school teachers alltogether. Similarly, 
the geographic distribution of the public health, education and court 
system structures reflect Serbia’s demographic structure of several 
decades ago much better than the strucutre of today.  
this is why it is extremely important that it be clear that the dialogue 
we propose here is about policy options, about the choices that 
need to be made.  If some policies are chosen, others may need to 
be abandoned, or postponed. Such a dialogue would help the reform 
efforts aimed at policy planning and coordination by raising awareness 
about everything society stands to gain from setting clearer priorities, 
and following them consistently. 
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• even when the political will 
Is not lackIng, It Is Hard to call 
IMPleMenters to account. 
However, contrary to widespread perception, difficulties in policy 
implementation are not always a matter of a lack of political will. On 
the contrary, the problem is that the implementation of certain complex 
policies may not be possible unless it is accompanied by a concerted 
political effort – mobilization, campaigning, and even pressure. In other 
words, some measure of politicization in Serbia seems to be necessary 
for complex policy implementation to happen. This is a structural 
problem that needs to be understood and resolved if Serbia is ever 
to develop a rules-based, effective, institutional system. We see two 
reasons for this.
one reason is that it is often impossible to identify clear and 
feasible accountability for tasks/results. Although the government 
administration seems to follow a reasonable organizational structure, 
the regulatory framework and distribution of competences (and tasks) 
among them does not match each organizational unit with clear 
competences. Many institutions, including both government levels, 
are involved in decision-making, even over non-strategic matters 
Moreover, none of them quite have the authority, competence, and 
autonomy needed to take the initiative and full responsibility for the 
results. Therefore, none can be called to account. The roots of this 
problem probably lie in the past, when the country was presumably 
run by highly participatory self-management decision making, yet 
no formal political bodies were given the authority to actually make 
decisions and take final actions. These were made by the communist 
party in the background, through informal, parallel processes. 
the second phenomenon is that regulatory practice is highly detailed, 
prescriptive, and formal. As such, it simply precludes the definition 
and pursuit of meaningful results. For example, the manager of 
an organizational unit is not given funding with which to staff his 
organization and produce results. Instead, the number and profiles 
of staff that can be hired and most other expenditure decisions he/
she makes are prescribed in great detail with rules and formal criteria. 
Of course, some such constraints are present in every administration, 
but in Serbia they are extreme. This releases her or him from making 
judgments and decisions that could ensure the result is being 
accomplished.  
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• the capacity of Specific 
InstItutIons to delIver sPecIFIc 
sdg targets sHould be MonItored 
as InterMedIate targets. 
ultimately, we are interested in identifying instruments/indicators 
that would help assess trends in the capacity of specific, relevant 
institutions to deliver results. These could be seen as important 
elements of the results framework developed to monitor and 
encourage progress towards the accomplishment of nationalized 
SDGs. For example, as seen in these pages, drawbacks in the delivery 
of education and health services can, among other things, be linked to 
the institutional inability to change. We might want to measure if there 
is appropriate organizational change, as an indicator of intermediate 
institutional capacity and progress towards accomplishing the SDGs 
in those areas. Or, we might want to support the predictability of the 
business environment, and hence the accomplishment of GDP growth 
and employment targets by measuring the consistency with which 
specific government programs are being implemented. 
Such a process would complement the high-level institutional reform 
monitoring effort conducted every year by the EC, as well as mobilize 
stakeholders to understand better how their interests are linked with 
these reforms. 
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PIllar Iv – ProsPerous and 
coHesIve coMMunItIes 
Local communities are where all aspects of development are set in 
motion and interact, so most SDGs and targets affect them.
People live with each other and interact mostly in their local 
communities; this is where they create value, where they are inspired 
or affected by the environment, and where they should not leave 
their neighbors behind. Not only do many nationwide policies require 
involvement and participation at the local level, but quite a few are 
best left fully in the competence of communities, to conceive and 
implement.
• in Serbia lSg unitS perform a 
broad array oF tasks, but tHere 
are FeW areas In WHIcH tHey truly 
exercIse sovereIgn PoWer. 
Fully in the competence of local self-governments (LSG) units are 
culture, recreation, preschool education, communal services, and 
local roads and housing—each in the realm of different SDGs. In order 
to perform their tasks, LSGs establish local public companies, such 
as utility companies for water supply and waste water, solid waste 
disposal, and district heating, as well as institutions and organizations 
in various areas (education, culture, sports, social policy, etc.). In many 
of the remaining areas—such as social protection, education, health and 
environmental protection—the republic (and autonomous provinces) 
can and does delegate responsibilities. To date, however, in these areas 
policies are largely made by the republic, which has kept the ultimate 
decision-making power and most of the funding. LSGs tend to be their 
implementers. This is a substantially more centralized set-up than is 
customary in Europe, particularly considering that Serbia has some of 
the largest LSGs units in Europe. LSGs have a relatively limited taxing 
and revenue collection authority (mostly based on taxing property) 
and depend on tax revenue-sharing and transfers from the republic for 
the bulk of their revenues.
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• own houSing provideS economic 
securIty, but coMMunal servIces, 
esPecIally Waste ManageMent, 
need IMProveMent.
Widespread home ownership is a legacy shared with other post-
communist countries. In Serbia, 80% of the population lives in family 
owned dwellings not burdened by mortgages. Another 2% owns and 
pays mortgages. For nearly one half of the remaining population—7% 
of households— however, housing expenses comprise more than 50% 
of their budget expenditures. With population numbers declining, this 
strength will be maintained.
It is a problem, also, that the affordability of communal services is 
attained at the expense of quality, and with a reduction in developmental 
potential. Local utility companies (LUCs) are managed under the heavy 
influence of politics. They often underprice their services and manage 
their operations with weak financial discipline, instead of securing 
explicit, possibly selective, subsidies paid to those that need them. 
The consequence is low service quality, underinvestment, wasted 
resources, and missed opportunities. 
as regards local transport and access to water and sewage, the 
experience is similar to other post-communist countries, servicing 
a good number but falling short of some of the population’s needs. 
eighty-four percent of households are connected to water supply 
system, and 59% are connected to sewage systems. While access to 
sewage has been improving over recent years, increasing by 10% over 
2012-16, ensuring clean drinking water continues to be a challenge in 
parts of Vojvodina with high levels of arsenic in underground waters, 
and elsewhere in municipalities where maintenance and investment 
have been inadequate. Affordable transport is an extremely important 
condition for the inclusion and employability of people living in less 
developed or remote areas of the country. In rural areas today there is 
still a significant share of the population that faces difficulties accessing 
public transport, even roads, and hence accessing schools, health-care 
and jobs.
In the area of waste management, however, serbia does fall seriously 
short, both in comparison with other countries and its own potential. 
The coverage of municipal waste collection is at 80%, while 20% 
of waste does not end up in municipal landfills. In and of itself this 
proportion is not satisfactory, and most of these landfills do not satisfy 
EU regulations. There are only 10 operating sanitary landfills, and there 
are no composting centers or incinerator facilities. Moreover, there 
are an estimated 3000 wild dumpsites. The situation is even worse 
with wastewater treatment and disposal, with only 17% of wastewaters 
treated (only 35 of 50 water treatment plants are operational). The 
improvements in this area envisaged by the Waste Management 
Strategy are not being met, although they primarily require better 
community mobilization and local-national policy coordination, at 
costs that are affordable. 
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a particularly telling problem wholly in the realm of local governments 
is the extent and persistence of illegal construction over the last two 
decades. It is estimated that the share of all informal settlements is 
5-25% (similar to neighboring countries). These informal settlements 
are classified either as large suburban residential areas, with family 
houses built on private or public land, or as slums, built on public land, 
mostly populated with vulnerable groups like Roma (the latter are less 
frequent). The absence of any planning in their development saddles 
them with long-term developmental problems, such as insufficient 
space allocated to the satisfaction of shared, public needs – such as 
streets and parks. They also usually suffer from a low level of communal 
services and infrastructure problems, particularly with the sewage and 
heating systems.
• the central government’S com-
Petence In Most develoPMent as-
Pects Has not reduced regIonal 
dIFFerences In outcoMes.
regional development differences in serbia are deep, and the 
transition has further exacerbated them. The global shifts in production 
over the 1990s and the transition in Serbia have particularly hit heavy 
industrial production and the towns that strongly depended on them. 
At the same time, the provision of services grew, similarly reflecting 
global trends, but also making up for the underdevelopment which 
occurred under the socialist economy. As in the post-communist 
countries, this has benefited Belgrade and Novi Sad far more than the 
rest of the country. The key macro indicator, GDP per capita, indicates 
that Belgrade, followed by Vojvodina, is much more developed than 
the rest of the Serbia, with GDP per capita 2.5 times higher than in the 
least developed region of Southern and Eastern Serbia. Although the 
region of Southern and Eastern Serbia contributes 22% of the total 
population, it generates only 14% of country’s GDP. Poverty is primarily 
concentrated in non-urban areas, especially in Southern and Eastern 
Serbia. The poverty rate in this region was as high as 13%, twice the 
levels in Vojvodina, Western Serbia and Sumadija, and three times that 
of Belgrade. In addition, the population at risk of poverty (i.e., the share 
of the population living below 60% of the median income) was also 
highest in this region.
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Figure 17: The 24% of Serbia’s citizens that live in Belgrade produce 40% of Serbia’s GDP. 
the provision of central funding and public services contributes to 
reducing inequalities, but this is accomplished less by equalizing 
productive capacity and more through subsidized consumption. 
Substantial financial transfers are being made to incentivize investors, 
and fund employment in the public sector. However, development 
would be better served if more of these resources were invested 
in building productive capacity, such as knowledge and physical 
infrastructure.
ultimately, differences in regional economic and social development 
in serbia are sharp even if belgrade is excluded from the analysis. 
While Vojvodina’s GDP per capita is 1.5 times larger than that of 
the region of Southern and Eastern Serbia, the differences are even 
sharper within the regions themselves. Gross value added per capita 
in the most developed district in the region of Southern and Eastern 
Serbia (Pirotski) is more than 2 times larger than that of the least 
developed district in the same region (Podunavski). This is creating a 
“leopard skin” of economic development and disconnected economic 
environments.
If broader concept of development (similar to HDI) is used as a measure, 
level of development among districts is different than when measured 
only through GDP per capita – but differences between districts are 
still sharp and significant. For example, Pirotski district has GVA per 
capita higher than Moravicki, but in Pirotski, life expectancy at birth 
is about 2.5 years shorter and completion rate of secondary school 
is 12 percentage points lower than in Moravicki, resulting in Moravicki 
having a higher development index value than Pirotski.  However, 
differences between socio-economic development of regions are still 
strong – level of development of Belgrade district is similar to the 
level of development of Hungary or Croatia, level of development of 
Moravicki district is similar to the level of development of Azerbaijan 
or Georgia, while level of development of Serbia’s least developed 
district - -Toplicki, is similar to the level of development of Jamaica or 
Suriname.
Source: SORS
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Figure 18: Differences in the level of socio-economic development are even sharper within the 
regions themselves.
Source: CEVES’ calculations on UNDP, SORS, and World Bank data
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• local communitieS lack the toolS 
and autonoMy tHey need to Fully 
take resPonsIbIlIty For solvIng 
develoPMent ProbleMs.
The wide regional/local disparities in human development and 
economic conditions require different and locally adapted policy 
responses. However, the key challenge in local development, especially 
in large cities, is for its citizens themselves to confront complex local 
problems and tackle them together, as communities. The many urban, 
environmental, safety and societal problems that characterize human 
settlements are very specific to each locality and require local action. 
Yet, only with such action can the great sustainability challenges facing 
humanity, both social and environmental, be overcome. Stemming 
global warming and conserving natural resources require radical 
changes in the way we conduct everyday life—from reducing and 
recycling waste, to reshaping urban transportation systems. Ensuring 
that these changes do not bypass the vulnerable is also a particular 
challenge, most often requiring localized solutions. Just as central 
planning proved to be incapable of distributing goods where they 
were needed, so it is the local communities, not central governments, 
that know who needs help, and what kind. Solving such challenges 
together is what makes a community, and it adds up to much more 
than the sum of the development aspects mentioned above. 
Most of serbia’s lsg units struggle with the challenges of local 
sustainable development because they lack the necessary 
autonomy and tools to resolve them. It does not help that the 
territorial distribution of power fogs accountabilities, along the 
lines described in Chapter III. Serbia’s LSG level does not lack in 
the number of development aspects in which it is involved. The 
problem is that for the most part it is the implementer of national 
policies, rather than the creator of its own policies. Furthermore, 
the national government often tasks the local level with incomplete, 
or underfunded tasks. It also prescribes in minute detail how tasks, 
even those fully in the local competence, are to be carried out. It is 
true that some LSG units lack the necessary capacity to deal with 
their development needs, but this is less important than is usually 
believed. Finally, shared solutions require social trust and citizen 
participation, and these are much lacking in Serbia, as in the post-
communist countries.
to illustrate, local governments run secondary schools, through locally 
elected boards, but centrally appointed directors. These schools’ 
curricula should adjust to local economic development needs and 
visions, but to change their profiles, local governments not only 
have to follow some central government guidelines, but also lobby 
until the central profile allocations have been changed. The budgets 
of all providers of social services, schools included, are completely 
compartmentalized, with the central government funding teachers’ 
salaries, local governments funding school infrastructure, and very 
little regular funding dedicated to school program development by 
either. For some reason, national regulations do not permit the LSGs 
to provide transportation for high-school students, and the LSG units 
that do it are in fact defying the law.
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It does not help that the institutional framework for regional/local 
development management needs much improvement. Regional and 
sub-regional development policies are much needed but few are in 
place. The policy framework in this regard lacks a number of elements: 
(a) The weak framework for policy coordination and planning at the 
national level affects, of course, the local level as well; (b) the gap 
is particularly acute at the intermediate level (i.e., right below the 
national level), in cases where several LSG units need to coordinate 
their efforts, and when development projects (such as those involving 
watersheds or transport) affect larger territories; (c) dedicated 
institutional capacities are weak and periodically weakened by political 
turnarounds; (d) there is no regional development strategy or plan at 
the national level, which would serve as the basis for the alignment 
of specific regional strategies and ensure a coordinated approach in 
financing territorial cohesion and the reduction of regional disparities.
• Stakeholder engagement in 
FosterIng local sdgs  could Make 
an IMPortant contrIbutIon to 
local develoPMent!
SDGs provide a framework that can be very useful in disentangling 
the constraints that weaken local initiative and accountability. Serbia’s 
tradition involves strong local competences and initiative. However, 
the muddied system of accountabilities is, as mentioned above, also a 
deep legacy. Together with conflicting incentives and constraints, it all 
to easily orients the energies of local communities towards extracting 
central authority favor and support, rather than relying on their own 
resources. This turns development efforts into a zero-sum game for 
redistributing the pie, rather than expanding it. Inclusion into the 
global effort to meet SDGs could help spread awareness of what can 
be accomplished, and of the many ways these goals can and are being 
accomplished throughout the world.
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lIst oF FIgures
FIgure 1: 
SDG dimensions are grouped in four pillars — according to Serbia’s socio-economic development potential 
and issues.
FIgure 2: 
Serbia is one of the lowest ranked European countries in terms of the level of human development, as 
measured by the HDI.
FIgure 3: 
Serbia’s GDP per capita (4,905 euros) is among the lowest in Europe, and it stands nearly 40% below that of 
Bulgaria, the lowest among EU member states.
FIgure 4: 
The key problem is an exceptionally low total employment level, and especially of the decent kind.
FIgure 5: 
Full employment in decent jobs requires an increase of almost 75% (1.45 million) in the current number of 
formal jobs – to employ the unemployed, the discouraged, and those working informally.
FIgure 6: 
Only exports of the new economy grew throughout the period, reaching 93% of total exports in 2015 and 
indicating that the transformation of the economy is in its final stage.
FIgure 7:
Educational coverage is similar to EU levels, while the educational level is rising
FIgure 8: 
Education outcomes are still weak – with low expenditure likely playing an important role.
FIgure 9: 
There is a marked disproportion between Serbia’s total level of spending (% of GDP) on health, by the 
government and out-of-pocket, and the level of its citizens’ life expectancy.
FIgure 10: 
Every fourth person in Serbia is below the relative poverty line (i.e., earns less than 60% of median income) 
– one of the highest shares in Europe.
FIgure 11: 
Assuming that current demographic trends continue, Serbia’s population is likely to shrink by almost 600.000 
(8%) citizens by 2030.
FIgure 12:
The contribution of the agri-food sector to GDP and total employment in Serbia is exceptionally high.
FIgure 13: 
Serbia is among the top 10 European net exporters of agricultural and food products.
FIgure 14a: 
Export growth of mid- and mid-to-high level technology industry has been dynamic since the crisis.
FIgure 14b: 
Domestic enterprises — specially small and medium ones, significantly contributed to export growth of 
majority of manufacturing sectors.
FIgure 15: 
The export of services — especially computer programming – is growing fast.
FIgure 16:
 Serbia has the lowest electricity price and the second highest energy intensity among comparable countries.
FIgure 17: 
The 24% of Serbia’s citizens that live in Belgrade produce 40% of Serbia’s GDP.
FIgure 18: 
Differences in the level of socio-economic development are even sharper within the regions themselves.
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